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I. Carry Trade
A “naive” investment strategy that chases high yields around the world
works remarkably well in currency markets. This strategy is typically
referred to as the carry trade in foreign exchange, and it has consistently
been very profitable over the last 3 decades. Figure 1 compares the per-
formance of a levered carry trade strategy (denoted HMLFX)n e to f
transaction costs to that of an unlevered buy‐and‐hold strategy in the
U.S. stock market. The figure plots the cumulative return on both strat-
egies, starting in November of 1983.
1 This carry trade strategy simply
involves taking short positions in a portfolio of low interest rate curren-
cies and long positions in a portfolio of high interest rate currencies. We
leveredthecarrytradestrategyuptomatchthevolatilityofstockreturns
in our sample of 14.84%. Investing one dollar in the stock market would
haveyielded$2.71whileinvestingonedollarinthecarrytradeproduced
$3.36 by July of 2008. That is a cumulative return difference of 65% over
25 years.
The seminal work on the failure of uncovered interest rate parity by
Hansen and Hodrick (1980) and Fama (1984) was published before or
around the start of our sample in 1983. More than 25 years have gone
by. The profitability of the carry trade is presumably well understood
by now. Moreover, the daily volume in currency markets has increased
nearly tenfold in a market that is dominated by large, sophisticated in-
vestors. Many hedge funds and, more recently, some ETFs (exchange
traded funds) are actively engaged in the carry trade. However, as is
clear from the slope of the carry trade line in figure 1, the carry trade
premium has increased substantially in the second part of the sample.
The average logexcess returnaftertransactioncosts has increased from
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annum in the second part of the sample. Clearly, this is not a temporary
anomaly that is about to be arbitraged away, and understanding carry
trade returns is a critical step toward a better understanding of exchange
rates. So what accounts for the carry trade premium?
The size of these carry trade returns in highly liquid and intercon-
nected foreign exchange markets presents a challenge to modern asset‐
pricing theory. In their innovative piece for this volume, Brunnermeier,
Nagel, and Pedersen contribute to our understanding of the carry trade
by documenting a new stylizedfact, the skewness of returns on the carry
trade. Brunnermeier et al. argue that carry trade investors incur crash
risk, because exchange rate movements between high interest rate and
low interest rate currencies are negatively skewed, and they conclude
that this negative skewness is due to sudden unwinding of carry trades,
which tend to occur during liquidity shortfalls.
2
We show that the skewness documented by Brunnermeier et al. in
individualcurrencycrossesshowsupincurrencyportfoliosaswell.Cur-
rency portfolios allow investors to eliminate some of the idiosyn-
cratic risk in individual currencies while still capturing the carry trade
Fig. 1
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though it is not entirely clear that higher interest rate currencies expose
investors to more skewness, and this is a necessary condition if crash
riskisthemaindeterminantofcurrencyriskpremia.Nonetheless,there
isagrowingbodyof evidencethat lowand highinterest rate currencies
have very different risk characteristics, and this new evidence on crash
risk will become an important part of that.
We start in Section II by reviewing the evidence on the failure of
uncovered interest rate parity. Section III documents the skewness
of currency portfolio returns, and, finally, Section IV demonstrates that
high interest rates expose currency investors not only to more crash
riskbut tomoreaggregate risk,broadlydefined.Thecurrencyportfolio
data are available from our Web site.
II. The Failure of Uncovered Interest Rate Parity
The time‐series evidence for individual currency pairs suggests that in-
vestors earn high excess returns by investing in currencies with interest
rates that are higher than usual. We review this evidence in this section.
The next section shows that investors earn large excess returns simply
by investing in currencies with currently high interest rates.
We start by setting up some notation. Lowercase symbols denote logs.
We use s to denote the log of the spot exchange rate in units of foreign
currency per U.S. dollar and f for the log of the forward exchange rate,
alsoinunitsofforeigncurrencyperU.S.dollar.Anincreaseinsmeansan
appreciation of the home currency. The log excess return rx on buying a
foreign currency in the forward market and then selling it in the spot
market after 1 month is simply
rxtþ1¼ ft   stþ1:
This excess return can also be stated as the log forward discount minus
the change in the spot rate: rxtþ1¼ ft   st   Δstþ1. In normal conditions,
forward rates satisfy the covered interest rate parity condition; the for-
ward discount is equal to the interest rate differential: ft   st≈i 
t   it,
where i  and i denote the foreign and domestic nominal risk‐free rates
over the maturity of the contract. Hence, the log currency excess re-
turn approximately equals the interest rate differential less the rate of
depreciation:
rxtþ1 ≈ i 
t   it   Δstþ1:
Comment 363The carry trade consists of taking long positions in foreign currency
with high interest rates i :
rxtþ1 ¼ð ft   stÞ
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
forward premium
  Δstþ1 |ﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄ}
depreciation
¼ i 
t   it   Δstþ1 |ﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄ}
depreciation
;
and short positions in foreign currency with low interest rates i :
 rxtþ1 ¼  ðft   stÞþ Δstþ1 |ﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄ}
depreciation
¼ it   i 
t þ Δstþ1 |ﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄ}
depreciation
:
We use m to denote the log of the investor’sI M R S( i n t e r t e m p o r a lm a r -
ginal rate of substitution) or stochastic discount factor. The carry trade





Vart½rxtþ1 ¼ Cov½mtþ1; rxtþ1 :
We can simply ignore the Jensen inequality term for now, because it is
second order. When investors are risk neutral or when the returns do
not covary with the investors’ intertemporal marginal rate of substitu-
tion, then we do not expect the carry trade to produce positive or nega-
tive excess returns. There is no reason to expect investors to be risk
neutral or to assume that this covariance is zero. However, this is a use-




The failure of uncovered interest rate parity in time‐series data for in-
dividual currencies is well documented (Hansen and Hodrick 1980;
Fama 1984).
3 Regressions of the rate of depreciation on the interest rate
difference or the forward discount almost invariably reveal negative
slope coefficients bi < 0:
Δsi
tþ1 ¼ ai þ biðf i
t   si
tÞþεi
tþ1:
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ciation. Hence, investors earn more by holding bonds from currencies
with interest rates that are higher than usual:
Et½rxi
tþ1 ¼ð 1   biÞðf i
t   si
tÞ ai:
As many have pointed out, it might be challenging for an investor to im-
plement this trading strategy. What does “usual” mean? This requires a
p r e c i s ee s t i m a t eo ft h ec o n s t a n ti nt h er e g r e s s i o nai. In addition, there
might be a peso problem for individual currencies (see Cochrane [2001,
chap. 20] for a comprehensive discussion).
B. Cross‐Sectional Evidence
We adopt a much simpler approach that sidesteps these issues. We
build portfolios of positions in 1‐month forward contracts sorted on for-
ward discounts (Lustig and Verdelhan 2007; Lustig, Roussanov, and
Verdelhan 2008), and we show that UIP fails in the cross section too:
1. For high (h) interest rate currencies, the average interest rate differ-
ence exceeds the rate of depreciation:
Eh½rxi
tþ1 ¼Eh½ f i
t   si
t  Eh½Δsi
tþ1  > 0:
2. For low (l) interest rate currencies, the average interest rate differ-
ence is not offset by the average rate of depreciation:
El½rxi
tþ1 ¼El½ f i
t   si
t  El½Δsi
tþ1  < 0:
Investors earnmorebyholdingbonds fromcurrencieswithinterestrates
that are currently high. Whether the interest rate is higher than usual
doesnotmatter.Inaddition,thepesoproblemthatisparamountforindi-
vidual currencies is less important.
Building currency portfolios. At the end of each period t, we allocate all
currencies in the sample to six portfolios on the basis of their forward
discounts f   s observed at the end of period t.
4 Portfolios are rebal-
anced at the end of every month. They are ranked from low to high
interest rates; portfolio 1 contains the currencies with the lowest interest
rate or smallest forward discounts, and portfolio 6 contains the curren-




of the log currency excess returns in each portfolio j. For the purpose of
Comment 365computing returns net of bid‐ask spreads we assume that investorsshort
all the foreign currencies in the first portfolio and go long in all the other
foreign currencies.
The total number of currencies in our portfolios varies over time. We
have a total of nine countries at the beginning of the sample in 1983 and
26 at the end in 2008. We include only currencies for which we have
forward and spot rates in the current and subsequent period. The max-
imum number of currencies attained during the sample is 34; the
launch of the euro accounts for the subsequent decrease in the number
of currencies. The average number of portfolio switches per month is
6.01 for portfolios sorted on 1‐month forward rates. We define the aver-
age frequency as the time average of the following ratio: the number of
portfolio switches divided by the total number of currencies at each
date. The average frequency is 29.32%, implying that currencies switch
portfolios roughly every 3 months.
Since we have bid‐ask quotes for spot and forward contracts, we can
compute the investor’s actual realized excess return net of transaction
costs. The net log currency excess return for an investor who goes long
in foreign currency is
rxl
tþ1¼ f b
t   sa
tþ1:
The investor buys the foreign currency or equivalently sells the dollar
forward at the bid price ( f b) in period t and sells the foreign currency or
equivalently buys dollars at the ask price (sa
tþ1) in the spot market in
period t þ 1. Similarly, for an investor who is long in the dollar (and
thus short the foreign currency), the net log currency excess return is
given by
rxs
tþ1 ¼  f a
t þ sb
tþ1:
UIP fails in the cross section. Tables 1 and 2 provide an overview of the
properties of the six currency portfolios from the perspective of a U.S.
investor in currency markets between November 1983 and July 2008.
Detailed results are available in Lustig et al. (2008).
For each portfolio j, we report average changes in the spot rate Δsj,
the forward discounts f j   sj, the log currency excess returns rxj ¼
 Δsjþ f j   sj,and the logcurrencyexcess returns net ofbid‐askspreads
rx
j
net. Finally, we also report log currency excess returns on carry trades
or high‐minus‐low investment strategies that go long in portfolio j ¼
2; 3 ... ; 6 and short in the first portfolio: rx
j
net   rx1
net.A l le x c h a n g e
ratesandreturnsarereportedinU.S.dollars,andthemomentsofreturns





. The Sharpe ratio is the ratio of the annual-
ized mean to the annualized standard deviation. In table 1, panel 1 re-
ports for the comprehensive sample of currencies, while panel 2 looks
onlyatdevelopedcountrycurrencies.Thedataappendixcontainsacom-
prehensive list of currencies.
According to the standard UIP condition, the average rate of depre-
ciation ETðΔsjÞ of currencies in portfolio j should equal the average for-
warddiscountonthesecurrenciesETð f j   sjÞ,reportedintable1,panelC.
Instead, currencies in the first portfolio trade at an average forward
discount of −388 basis points, but they appreciate on average only by
8 6b a s i sp o i n t so v e rt h i ss a m p l e .T h i sa d d su pt oal o gc u r r e n c ye x c e s s
return of −302 basis points on average, which is reported in panel D.
Currenciesinthelast portfoliotrade atanaveragediscount of 776basis
points, but they depreciate only by 168 basis points on average. This
adds up to a log currency excess return of 608 basis points on average.
Panel E of table 1 reports average log currency excess returns net of
transaction costs. Since we rebalance portfolios monthly, and transac-
tion costs are incurred each month, these estimates of net returns to cur-
rency speculation are conservative. Moreover, Lyons (2001, 115) reports
that bid‐ask spreads from Reuters are roughly twice the size of inter-
dealerspreads.Asaresult,ourestimatesofthetransactioncostsareprob-
ably too high. After taking into account bid‐ask spreads, the average
return on the first portfolio drops to −170 basis points. Note that the first
column reports minus the actual log excess return for the first portfolio,
because the investor is short in these currencies. The corresponding
Sharpe ratio on this first portfolio is −0.22. The return on the sixth port-
foliodropsto334basispoints.ThecorrespondingSharperatioonthelast
portfolio is 0.36.
Panel F reports returns on zero‐cost strategies that go long in the high
interest rate portfolios and short in the low interest rate portfolio. The
spread between the net returns on the first and the last portfolio is 513
basis points. This high‐minus‐low strategy delivers a Sharpe ratio of
0.57, after taking into account bid‐ask spreads. Equity returns provide
a natural benchmark. Over the same sample, the (annualized) Fama‐
French monthly log excess return on the U.S. stock market is 5.78%,
and the equity Sharpe ratio is 0.38. Note that this equity return does
not reflect any transaction cost.
Exotic currencies? The carry trade premium does not disappear when
we exclude developing country currencies from our sample. These results





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































371for transaction costs, the Sharpe ratio on the high‐minus‐low strategy is
still.43,inspiteofthefactthattherearefewercurrenciesineachportfolio
and hence the benefits of diversification are much smaller. Clearly, the
carry trade risk premium is not specific to emerging markets. This is in
line with the findings of Bansal and Dahlquist (2000), who examine the
time‐series evidence for a large sample of currencies. They find that the
UIP slope coefficients actually increase for currencies in developing
countries with higher inflation.
Temporary anomaly? If this is an anomaly that will be arbitraged away,
then one would expect the carry premium to diminish over time, as the
volume in currency markets has exploded in the last decades. Between
1992 and 2008, the Bank for International Settlements estimates that the
average daily volume in currency markets increased from 800 billion to
3.75 trillion (2007 annual report). This number dwarfs the volume of
trade in any other asset market. Of course, most of this volume occurs
in the major crosses. However, we found that the carry premium does
not disappear when we limit ourselves to the currencies of developed
countries. Instead, the size of the carry premium seems to have gone up
over time. The size of the carry premium after transaction costs in-
creased from 227 basis points between 1983 and 1995 to 698 basis points
between 1995 and 2008. Over the same period, the Sharpe ratio in-
creased from .46 to .79. If anything, the carry trade premium has in-
creased in the second part of the sample. The next section explores
whether the skewness of these exchange rate shocks and currency port-
folio returns can explain the cross‐sectional variation.
III. Currency Crashes and the Skewness of Carry Trade Returns
Brunnermeier et al. find substantial evidence of skewness in individual
currency crosses. We examine the skewness of exchange rate changes
and returns on a portfolio‐by‐portfolio basis. An investor can easily
construct these portfolios to eliminate some of the idiosyncratic risk
in individual currencies. In table 1, we report the skewness of exchange
rate changes and carry trade returns. The conditional skewness of log
returns skewness½rxtþ1 ¼skewnesst½Δstþ1  depends only on the skew-
ness of the changes in the exchange rate, because the interest rates are
known at the time of the investment. The unconditional skewness of
returns also depends on the properties of the forward discount. We find
that the carry trade definitely exposes investors to crash risk, but it is
less clear that higher interest rate corresponds to more crash risk.
Lustig and Verdelhan 372Does skewness explain the cross section of currency returns? We start in
table 1, panel 1, by looking at the skewness of exchange rate changes
(third row) in the comprehensive sample, and we find a beautiful pat-
tern. Higher interest rates mean more skewness against the dollar. The
skewness varies monotonically from −.24 for the first portfolio to .42 for
the last portfolio. As pointed out by Brunnermeier et al., in high interest
rate currencies large depreciations are much more likely. This pattern is
especially remarkable because the second moments of exchange rate
changes do not seem to vary at all across portfolios: the volatility of
exchange rate changes is between 7.5% and 9% per annum for all cur-
rencies. Moreover, there is no clear pattern in the kurtosis of exchange
rate changes. In panel 2, we report the same numbers for the limited
sample of developed currencies. In this case, currencies in the fourth
portfolio have more skewness (.47) than those in the fifth portfolio
(.14). However, these numbers are less reliable, because there are fewer
currencies in each portfolio, and hence the idiosyncratic risk is not aver-
aged out as well.
However,whatreallymattersistheconditionalskewnessofreturnson
a long position in high interest rate currencies and a short position in low
interest rate currencies: skewnesst½rx
j





tþ1 . These statistics are reported in panel B. The conditional skewness
of these carry trade positions is always positive. This implies that large
simultaneous depreciations of high interest rate currencies and apprecia-
tionsof lowinterestratecurrenciesaremorelikely.However,inthiscase,
the variation across portfolios is not monotonic. The skewness for the
fourth portfolio is 1, roughly the same as that of the last portfolio, but
the skewness for the fifth portfolio is only .3. Higher interest rates do
not seem to imply more skewness against the lowest interest rate curren-
cies. Figure 2 plots the skewness of exchange rate changes in dollars
against the mean excess return for each portfolio in the left panel. The
right panel plots the skewness of exchange rate changes for the long‐
short strategy against the mean excess returns on the long‐short strat-




variation in excess returns, the skewness of exchange rate shocks for the
long‐short strategy (skewnesst½Δs
j
tþ1   Δs1
tþ1 ) is not. For carry trade in-
vestors, the latter is what matters most.
The unconditional skewness of returns (skewnesst½rx
j
tþ1 )a l s od e -
pends on the properties of interest rates. These statistics are reported in
panels D–F of table 1. Panel D shows the properties of returns without
bid‐ask spreads. Panel E shows the same statistics after accounting for
Comment 373the bid‐ask spreads. Not surprisingly, we find a similar pattern. The
skewness of net returns varies quasi‐monotonically from .12 for the first
portfolioto−.35forthelastportfolio.However,whatreallymattersisthe
skewness of returns on the long‐short strategy, and these do not vary
monotonically with interest rates. After accounting for bid‐ask spreads,
the skewness of the returns on long in 6 and short in 1 is −.77. However,
theskewnessofthereturnsonastrategythatgoeslongin5andshortin1
isonly−.18,even thoughthe averagereturns arestill378basispoints per
annum for this strategy.
How much crash risk is there in the carry trade? To assess the quantity
of crash risk in these returns, it helps to use stock returns as bench-
mark. The skewness of monthly excess returns on the stock market
(in logs) is −1.24 over the same sample, compared to −.77 for the carry
trade strategy. We found the same pattern in daily returns (not re-
ported). While there is crash risk in the carry trade, it is considerably
less than the crash risk that the buy‐and‐hold investor is exposed to
in U.S. stock markets. We conclude our discussion by showing that
low and high interest rate currencies differ along other dimensions
as well.
Fig. 2
Lustig and Verdelhan 374IV. Interest Rates and Risk
If short‐term interest rates measure the amount of risk in the economy,
and there is plenty of evidence that they do, then high interest rate cur-
rencies are riskier than low interest rate currencies, and they will earn a
higher risk premium.
Implications of no arbitrage: Backus‐Foresi‐Telmer. In the absence of arbi-
trage opportunities, there exists a domestic m and a foreign m  such that
the change in the log of the exchange rate equals the difference in the
log of the pricing kernels:
5
stþ1   st ¼ mtþ1   m 
tþ1:
If markets are complete, m and m  are unique. As a result, the forward
premium can be decomposed into a risk premium and an expected de-
preciation component:
ft   st ¼ðft   Etstþ1ÞþEtΔstþ1;
log Et½Mtþ1  log Et½M 
tþ1 ¼Et½rxtþ1 þEt½mtþ1  Et½m 
tþ1 ;
wherewehaveusedcoveredinterestrateparitytogofromthefirsttothe
second equation. Hence, this gives rise to the no‐arbitrage risk premium
decomposition for currency (Backus, Foresi, and Telmer 2001):
Et½rxtþ1 ¼ðlog Et½Mtþ1  Et½mtþ1 Þ   ðlog Et½M 
tþ1  Et½m 
tþ1 Þ:
If we assume lognormality of the domestic pricing kernel M and the
foreign pricing kernel M , then the moments of order > 2 drop out and
the conditional risk premium on shorting the foreign currency is given
by the half the spread in conditional variances:
6
Et½rxtþ1 ¼:5ðVart½mtþ1  Vart½m 
tþ1 Þ:
The implications of this equation are very clear. To replicate the cross‐
sectionalpatternintable1,weneedlargerconditionalvariance Vart½mtþ1 
in low interest rate currencies, and smaller conditional variance in
Vart½mtþ1  in high interest rate currencies. In other words, we can repli-
cate the carry trade risk premium if short‐term interest rates measure the
quantity and price of risk in the economy. This turns out to be exactly
what one would expect on the basis of a cursory inspection of monetary
policy and the evidence from bond markets.
The U.S. experience. We take a closer look at the U.S. experience over
the last 2 decades. It seems reasonable to use the implied volatility in
Comment 375the U.S. stock market as a measure of the conditional variance of the
pricing kernel Vart½mtþ1 . Figure 3 plots the 12‐month change in the
3‐month T‐Bill yield against the VIX index implied volatility. We use
the 12‐month change in the yield instead of the level in order to elim-
inate the effect of changes in the level of inflation at lower frequencies,
because we are not interested in these. Clearly, large increases in the
implied volatility in U.S. stock markets invariably coincide with large
declines in the yields on Treasury bills. Most of the variation in short‐
term interest rates seems related to changes in market risk (Vart½mtþ1 ).
On September 18, 2008 (not shown in fig. 3), the VIX exceeded 42 and
the T‐Bill yield fell below 9 basis points.
This relation between monetary policy and risk in financial markets
is at the heart of the contribution by Atkeson and Kehoe (2009) to this
volume. They present evidence from bond markets that supports this
link between risk and interest rates. Most changes in short‐term interest
rates seem to signal changes in bond risk premia and hence risk, rather
than changes in expected inflation.
Why do high risk currencies or currencies with a high Vart½mtþ1  of-
fer insurance against aggregate risk?
7 Consider the simplest case of a
common shock. Different countries have different exposures to these
shocks. In particular, as the volatility of the common shock increases,
Fig. 3
Lustig and Verdelhan 376interest rates decline more in the countries with more exposure and less
in those with smaller exposure. Now, in case of negative common shock
realization, the currency of the country with the largest exposure to the
common shock appreciates:
stþ1   st ¼ log mtþ1   log m 
tþ1;
because it experiences a large increase in m , and similarly, in countries
with smaller exposure to the common shock, the currency depreciates
in case of a negative shock realization. Hence, low interest rate curren-
cies provide insurance against bad shocks in times of high volatility.
Case study: The mortgage crisis. This is exactly what happened during
the recent mortgage crisis. We use this episode as a case study. Figure 4
plots the monthly rate of appreciation of the yen against the world
stock market return (in daily data) between July of 2007 and March
of 2008. The yen appreciates when the world stock market declines.
By contrast, the NZD depreciates when the world stock market declines.
Figure 5 plots the monthly rate of appreciation of the NZD against the
world stock market return over the same period. Low interest rate cur-
rencies provide a hedge against market risk while high interest rate cur-
rencies expose investors to more market risk.
Fig. 4
Comment 377As a result, HMLFX, a long position in the sixth portfolio and a short
position in the first portfolio, exposes U.S. and foreign investors to lots
of systematic or aggregate risk. Figure 6 plots the HMLFX return against
the U.S. stock market return between February of 2007 and March of
2008. The correlation between these monthly returns is .76 in daily data.
Moreover, this is not an isolated event. Lustig et al. (2008) document the
same pattern in a number of episodes characterized by increased vola-
tility in global financial markets. For example, before, during, and after
the LTCM crisis, the correlation between the carry trade returns and
U.S. stock market returns increased to .73, as shown in figure 7.
So high interest rate currencies expose investors to more risk, not just
because these are more exposed to crash risk but, more generally, be-
cause these are more exposed to aggregate risk, while low interest rate
currencies provide insurance against aggregate risk. This is exactly
what is implied by the no‐arbitrage conditions in currency markets if
interest rates measure exposure to common risk.
8 Lustig et al. (2008)
show that all of these stylized facts about the carry trade are consistent




ward pressure on high interest rate currencies and upward pressure on
Fig. 5
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Fig. 7low interest rate currencies. Brunnermeier et al. provide some compelling
evidence for this. However, this is perfectly consistent with the macroeco-
nomic risk perspective that we adopt in our research. From a macro per-
spective,theliquidityshortfallsincurrencymarketsseemlesslikeacause,
more likeasymptom,similartodoctorswho tend toappearwhenthere is
anepidemicoutbreaksomewhere.Itisnotclearthatwewanttoblamethe
doctors for the outbreaks. This distinction has bite. If we are right, then
there is no need for a new paradigm to understand exchange rates. In ad-
dition, in that case, there is no reason to believe that high interest rate cur-
rencies start to trade like distressed assets in times of high volatility at
prices far below their intrinsic value. However, if we are wrong about this
andtheseliquidityshortfallsthemselvescausehighinterestratecurrencies
to depreciate during crises, then the welfare implications of large and per-
sistent mispricing in currency markets could be enormous given the vol-
ume of trade and capital flows that is governed by exchange rates.
V. Conclusion
Interest rates are to currency what book‐to‐market ratios are for stocks.
They measure a currency’s risk characteristics for foreign investors,
simply because of the response of short‐term interest rates to the quan-
tity of risk in financial markets. If interest rates measure how much risk
there is in the economy, as suggested by the evidence from bond and
currency markets, then low interest rate currencies offer insurance
against aggregate risk and high interest rate currencies increase expo-
sure to aggregate risk. Brunnermeier et al. contribute to our understand-
ing of these differences in risk characteristics between high and low interest
rate currencies by showing that long positions in high interest rate cur-
rencies and short positions in low interest rate currencies expose inves-
tors to substantial crash risk.
Data Appendix
We start from daily spot and forward exchange rates in U.S. dollars. We
build end‐of‐month series from November 1983 to March 2008. These
data are collected by Barclays and Reuters and available on Datastream.
Lyons (2001, 115) reports that bid‐ask spreads from Reuters are roughly
twice the size of interdealer spreads. As a result, our estimates of the
transaction costs are conservative. Lyons (2001) also notes that these
indicative quotes track interdealer quotes closely, only lagging the in-
terdealer market slightly at very high intraday frequency. This is clearly
Lustig and Verdelhan 380not an issue here at monthly horizons. Our main data set contains
37 currencies: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Euro Area, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong,
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Malaysia,
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Singapore,S o u t hA f r i c a ,S o u t hK o r e a ,S p a i n ,
Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, and United Kingdom. Some of
these currencies have pegged their exchange rate partly or completely to
the U.S. dollarover the course of the sample. We keep them in our sample
becauseforwardcontractswereeasilyaccessibletoinvestors.Weleaveout
Turkey and United Arab Emirates, even if we have data for these
countries, because their forward rates appear disconnected from their
spot rates. As a robustness check, we also study a smaller data set that
contains only 15 developed countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Euro Area, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. We
present all of our results on these two samples.
Endnotes
1. The carry trade returns are taken from Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2008). The
next section explains in detail how these carry trade returns are constructed. The return
on the U.S. stock market is the cum dividend return on the CRSP value‐weighted index.
2. There is a large class of papers that look for risk‐based explanations of the carry trade
returns. This segment includes recent papers by Backus, Foresi, and Telmer (2001), Harvey,
Solnik, and Zhou (2002), Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2005), Brennan and Xia (2006),
Campbell, de Medeiros, and Viceira (2006), Graveline (2006), Bansal and Shaliastovich
(2007), Farhi and Gabaix (2007), Hau and Rey (2007), Lustig and Verdelhan (2007), Colacito
(2008), Brunnermeier et al. (in this volume), and Verdelhan (forthcoming). Earlier work in-
cludes Hansen and Hodrick (1980), Fama (1984), Korajczyk (1985), Bekaert and Hodrick
(1992), and Bekaert (1995, 1996). The second class looks for non‐risk‐based explanations.
This segment includes papers by Froot and Thaler (1990), Lyons (2001), Gourinchas and
Tornell (2004), Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006), Burnside et al. (2006), Sarno, Leon, and
Valente (2006), Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2007a, 2007b), Frankel and Poonawala
(2007), Plantin and Shin (2007), and Burnside et al. (2008).
3. Hodrick (1987) and Lewis (1995) provide extensive surveys and updated regression
results. UIP appears to be a reasonable description of the data only in four cases. First,
Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) show that UIP is not rejected at high inflation levels, and
likewise Huisman et al. (1998) find that UIP holds for very large forward premia. Second,
Chaboud and Wright (2005) show that UIP is valid at very short horizons but is rejected
for horizons above a few hours. Third, Meredith and Chinn (2005) find that UIP cannot be
rejected at horizons above 5 years. Finally, Lothian and Wu (2005) find positive UIP slope
coefficients for France/UK and U.S./UK exchange rates on annual data over 1800–1999,
because of the 1914–49 subsample. Engel (1996) and Chinn (2006) provide recent surveys
of UIP tests. Such UIP regressions suffer from small sample bias and persistenceintheright‐
hand‐side variables, but Liu and Maynard (2005) and Maynard (2006) show that these biases
can only explain a small part of the results.
4. We use 1‐month currency excess returns built using and ranked on 1‐month forward
contracts. Yet, forward contracts areavailable at longer maturities of 2, 3, 6,and 12months.
The currencies in our sample are reported in the data appendix.
Comment 3815. See Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa‐Clara (2006) for a detailed analysis of this equation
and its implications for risk sharing across countries.
6. Without lognormality, the conditional risk premium on shorting the foreign currency
is given by the half the spread in conditional moments of log pricing kernels:
pt ¼ :5ðμ2;t   μ 
2tÞþð 1=6Þðμ3;t   μ 
3;tÞþ ...:
Define the conditional skewness of the pricing kernel:
μ3;t ¼ skewnesst½logMtþ1  SDt½logMtþ1 
3:
We need strong negative correlation between interest rate spreads and differences in con-
ditional skewness of log pricing kernels to replicate the pattern in the data. The condi-
tional skewness of the rate of depreciation is not the spread in the conditional skewness of
the log pricing kernels:
skewnesst½stþ1   st ¼skewnesst½logMtþ1   logM 
tþ1 
≠ skewnesst½logMtþ1  skewnesst½logM 
tþ1 :
There is no obvious connection between the skewness of the rate of depreciation and the
risk premium.
7. See Lustig and Verdelhan (2006) for a detailed explanation and more examples.
8. HMLFX is strongly related to macroeconomic risk; it has a U.S. consumption growth
beta between 1 and 1.5, consistent with the findings of Lustig and Verdelhan (2007). In
recent related work, DeSantis and Fornati (2008) provide more evidence that currency
returns compensate investors for systematic, business cycle risk.
9. Standard macro asset‐pricing models can replicate the negative slope in the UIP
time‐series regressions and, with some modification, the carry trade premium that we
document. Recent contributions to the risk‐based literature offer three types of fully spe-
cified models of the forward premium puzzle: Verdelhan (forthcoming) uses habit prefer-
ences in the vein of Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Bansal and Shaliastovich (2007) build
on the long‐run risk model pioneered by Bansal and Yaron (2004), and Farhi and Gabaix
(2007) augment the standard consumption‐based model with disaster risk following Barro
(2006). These three models have two elements in common: a persistent variable drives the
volatility of the log stochastic discount factor, and this variable co‐moves negatively with
the country’s risk‐free interest rate.
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